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1 From time to time, U.S. Treasury officials have questioned whether the Treasury should have a safety net that would allow it to continue to meet its obligations even in the event of an unforeseen depletion of its cash balances. 1 The original version of the Federal Reserve Act provided a robust safety net because the act implicitly authorized the new Reserve Banks to buy securities directly from the Treasury. The Banks made active use of their "direct purchase authority" during, and for a decade and a half after, World War I. Congress acted to prohibit direct purchases in 1935, but reversed course and provided a limited wartime exemption in 1942.
The exemption was renewed from time to time following the conclusion of the war but ultimately allowed to expire in 1981.
This paper addresses three questions: (1) why did Congress prohibit direct purchases in 1935 (after they had been utilized without incident for eighteen years), (2) why did Congress provide a limited exemption in 1942 (instead of simply removing the prohibition), and (3) why did Congress allow the exemption to expire in 1981?
Authority for Direct Purchases Provided by the Federal Reserve Act
The first sentence of Section 14 of the Federal Reserve Act provided that "any Federal Board that he was interested in borrowing funds for three months at an interest rate of 2 percent per annum. He suggested that, This is an excellent opportunity for the Federal Reserve Banks to secure a desirable short-time investment and to demonstrate their usefulness as fiscal agents of the Government. I propose, therefore, to offer the Federal Reserve Banks, the opportunity to take these certificates. Will you please get in touch with the Federal Reserve Banks and ascertain whether or not they care to take this loan and what amount they respectively desire to take?
Committee on Banking and Currency (March 3, 4, and 5, 1947, p. 120) .
3 Garbade (2012, pp. 131-133) . Quoted in Harding (1925, pp. 87-88) .
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The country being on the verge of war (President Wilson signed a declaration of war on April 6), the Banks agreed to take the certificates, but they weren't happy about it. The 2 percent interest rate was below market rates 5 and the Banks felt the loan was an inappropriate use of Federal
Reserve resources. The Governor of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston observed that,
[W]e should have preferred, had the taking of this issue by member banks been burdensome to them, to have rediscounted for them to meet their requirements, rather than to have taken the issue direct, and our committee are in hopes that should future financing of this sort become necessary that it will be dealt with in this way, and the loans placed at a rate that will induce the commercial banks to absorb the issue. Harding (1925, p. 88 , "The opinion of a majority of the members of the Federal Reserve Board, and of all of the Federal Reserve Bank Governors, was that the rate proposed … was too much below the market, and that it should have been at least two and one half per cent."), and Chandler (1958, p. 113 , "The 2 percent rate was well below market and unattractive to private buyers.").
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Quoted in Chandler (1958, pp. 113-114) . Quoted in Chandler (1958, p. 114) .
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The Treasury did not subsequently obtain any term credit directly from the Reserve Banks, but it did obtain a series of short-term "cash management" loans. 8 All of the loans were represented by certificates of indebtedness issued directly to the Banks. As illustrated in Table 1, most were for five days or less, although several ran for more than two weeks.
Until 1935, the Treasury continued to borrow directly from Federal Reserve Banks for cash management purposes as circumstances warranted.
9
The borrowings were sometimes relatively infrequent, as in 1926 (Table 2) , and sometimes more frequent, as in 1927 (Table 3) .
10
The 1935 The wartime cash management loans are noted in Hollander (1919, p. 25) , Hendricks (1933 , p. 272), 1918 Treasury Annual Report, pp. 24 and 27, 1919 Treasury Annual Report, pp. 55 and 260, 1917 Federal Reserve Board Annual Report, p. 265, 1918 Federal Reserve Board Annual Report, p. 274, 1917 Report, p. 98, 1926 Federal Reserve Board Annual Report, p. 116, 1929 Federal Reserve Board Annual report, p. 71, 1931 Federal Reserve Board Annual report, p. 54, and 1933 Treasury borrowed almost continually from the Federal Reserve during the fall of 1927, a period when it was actively engaged in retiring the Second Liberty Loan. Garbade (2012, pp. 172-178) .
Origin of the Prohibition
The Committee on Banking and Currency (April 19, 1935, p. 59) .
12
Committee on Banking and Currency (April 19, 1935, pp. 11-12) .
13
Committee on Banking and Currency (May 13, 1935, p. 13 and relatedly suggested in 1947 that the prohibition was aimed at preventing chronic deficits, Those who inserted this proviso were motivated by the mistaken theory that it would help to prevent deficit financing. According to the theory, Government borrowing should be subject to the "test of the market."
17
[T]here was a feeling that [the absence of a prohibition] left the door wide open to the Government to borrow directly from the Federal Reserve bank all that was necessary to finance the Government deficit, and that took off any restraint toward getting a balanced budget. Letter from Coolidge to Carter Glass, July 30, 1935, Box 46D, Carter Glass papers at the University of Virginia.
15
Committee of Conference (1935, pp. 50-51) .
16
Committee on the Judiciary (January 30 and February 2, 1942, pp. III and 44-45) .
17
Committee on Banking and Currency (March 3, 4, and 5, 1947, p. 2) .
18
Committee on Banking and Currency (March 3, 4, and 5, 1947, p. 8) .
[T]here was some feeling that [Congress] ought to give the money market more control and influence over what money the Government was going to be able to raise, and that if they stopped the open-market committee from purchasing directly from the Treasury they would thereby deter deficit financing. 
Relaxing the Prohibition in 1942
The United States was at war with Germany as well as Japan within days after the attack on Pearl Harbor. It was clear that the war, already in its third year in Europe, would be lengthy and expensive. Treasury would have to borrow huge sums of money, so Congress raised the debt ceiling from $65 billion to $125 billion. 23 Settling a large war loan drive was liable to strain the money markets, so Congress also relaxed, for the duration of the war, the prohibition against direct purchases of Treasury debt.
24
The initial proposal for relaxing the prohibition against direct purchases was simply to delete the words "but only in the open market" from the proviso that had been added to section 14(b) by the Banking Act of 1935. 25 However, the action ultimately taken was more nuanced, and served to restrain an aggressive use of direct purchases contemplated by Chairman Eccles. market is demoralized and an additional public offering might add to the confusion and demoralization of the market and do incalculable harm to the Government's credit and to the holders of outstanding Government obligations.
What Eccles Contemplated

26
Rather than being forced to access the credit markets at a time when the markets were "demoralized," the Treasury could call on the Fed to provide temporary financing until a more propitious time.
However, Eccles oral testimony suggests that he actually contemplated a far more expansive role, that the Fed might underwrite Treasury debt:
If the market situation happens to be unfavorable on any given day when a financing operation is up … the Federal Reserve System should be in a position where it can take care of it by a direct purchase from the Treasury of an issue of securities. That does not mean that the Federal Reserve System would hold indefinitely securities that are so purchased. It may purchase a block of securities at a given time and then sell them in the market at such time as the market may be favorable.
27
It might be that the market would be such that it would be difficult to float the necessary amount of securities at a particular time, in which case the Federal Reserve could take a portion of such securities and, later, could sell those securities. In that case the Federal Reserve would attempt to redistribute those securities. It would underwrite an issue and undertake to redistribute it when the market was favorable.
28
Eccles justified this unprecedented activity on the need for a stable Treasury market and, ultimately, on Treasury's need to finance the war unrestrained by the credit markets:
If the market is not prepared or willing to take the Treasury financing, the Treasury should not be put in a position … where it cannot do its necessary financing on a basis that is in line with what the Treasury has been financing on. In other words, it would be unfortunate for the rates on Government financing in a war period to be advancing all the time constantly. We need a stable financing. … We feel it is absolutely essential that the Government security market be stabilized . It is designed to assure the Treasury of its needed financing without any hampering, without the Treasury being dictated to, in a sense, by the market. In a war economy the markets for practically everything are controlled; your commodity markets are controlled; you have price controls. It certainly would seem to us that the Treasury with the assistance of the Federal Reserve System should be in a position, likewise, to exercise some control in the money market situation.
30
The Amended Proviso
In the end, Congress chose not to restore unfettered authority for the Fed to purchase
Treasury securities directly, but rather amended the proviso to section 14(b) to provide an exemption capped at $5 billion: The $5 billion cap limited how much the Fed could underwrite at any one time and precluded any significant accumulation of underwriting commitments.
Wartime Usage
The first several lines of If commercial banks are faced at tax periods not only with deposit withdrawals to meet tax payments but also with drains on their war loan accounts, they would have to follow one of four courses: If they had sufficient excess reserves with the Federal Reserve banks, they could reduce their excess balances to the extent necessary. If they did not have excess reserves -this normally is the case -they would have to sell sufficient securities to obtain the funds, or they could withdraw correspondent balances. That means from the correspondent banks, and those banks in turn would have to sell securities to meet the withdrawals -or they would have to borrow from the Reserve banks. All of these alternatives would tend to tighten money market conditions at a time when taxpayers would be drawing on their bank accounts to make their tax payments. In other words, if the Treasury could not borrow from the Federal Reserve banks by what is, in effect, an overdraft at these tax payment periods, and in this way avoid withdrawals from its war loan accounts to pay off maturing obligations, money conditions would unduly tighten and tend to [destabilize] the money market and the Government securities market. The purpose for which the direct-purchase authority has always been used in the past and would be used in the future is simply one of meeting the temporary needs of the Treasury which, if met in other ways, would entail either needless additional costs in 32 Committee on Banking and Currency (March 3, 4, and 5, 1947, pp. 3-4) . 33 12 managing the public debt or equally needless fluctuation in the securities and money markets for brief periods. What is involved in the proposed bill is not a question of monetary theory or policy, but simply a question of efficient, economical, and business-like management of the public debt.
The direct-purchase authority is, in effect, merely an overdraft privilege with the Reserve banks -a line of available credit for use if needed. Without it, the Treasury would feel obliged to carry much larger cash balances, which means that it would have to borrow more and thereby increase the amount and cost of the public debt.
34
Eccles argued that the same would continue to be true in the future,
[T]he authority ... is more needed than ever today, because of the size of our debt and the refinancing operations. The fact that tax collections are also very large, currently about $40,000,000,000 a year, means that quarterly withdrawals from the banking system are going to continue to be heavy, so that it will be desirable to have the overdraft authority to help in stabilizing the money market at tax dates.
35
The House Banking Committee agreed with Eccles as to the benefits of the exemption, By providing this line of credit the Treasury has a source to which it may turn to obtain funds in a substantial amount on little notice to meet temporary situations and contingencies. With such an emergency source of funds, it is possible for the Treasury to operate with a smaller cash balance than might otherwise be necessary, thus resulting in a saving of interest. 36 Furthermore, direct buying provides a flexible method of easing the money market in periods of heavy drain as, for example, around income-tax dates. By borrowing funds from the Federal Reserve banks and expending them prior to tax dates, the Treasury can put the funds into the market; and, as taxes are received, such special borrowings are reduced and some retired. In this connection the direct purchase authority provides for efficient and businesslike management of the public debt. 37 Nevertheless, the committee did not believe that making the exemption permanent was "advisable." Instead, the committee provided for an extension of the exemption until June 30, 34 Committee on Banking and Currency (March 3, 4, and 5, 1947, p. 3).
Committee on Banking and Currency (March 3, 4, and 5, 1947, p. 4) .
36
Committee on Banking and Currency (March 10, 1947, pp. 1-2 
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There were two ways to mitigate the problem. First, Treasury could require payment of interest on TT&L deposits, allowing it to go back to the pre-1972 regime and to maintain no more than a small, but stable, balance at Federal Reserve Banks. However, commercial banks could not pay interest on TT&L accounts in the absence of new statutory authority -a lengthy process.
Alternatively (or additionally), Treasury could issue short-dated "cash management" bills to the public in the first half of a month, for redemption in the second half of a month, thereby borrowing from the public rather than relying on balances at Federal Reserve Banks. This option did not require any new statutory authority.
Short-term Cash Management Bills
Short-term cash management bills were introduced in August 1975. The first offering was for $1 billion, announced Wednesday, August 6, auctioned on August 7, and issued on The second and third short-term cash management bills were offered in September 1975 -a total of $1.5 billion of 13-and 20-day bills. In announcing the offerings, Treasury stated that the need for cash management instruments "has substantially increased over the past several years and is a result of the growing concentration of large payments in the first several working 41 Brockschmidt (1975 ), McDonough (1976 ), and Lovett (1978 .
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The bill was a reopening of an old year bill. Year bills at that time were issued on a Tuesday and matured 52 weeks later, on a Tuesday. Issuance of short-term cash management bills continued on an "as-needed" basis through the balance of the 1970s (Table 5) . Every bill was issued in the first half of a month and matured in the second half of a month.
Interest-Bearing TT&L Balances
The The new cash management program went into effect on November 2, 1978. 46 The interest rate on TT&L deposits was set at the weekly average effective Federal funds rate published by the Federal Reserve, less 25 basis points, a rate that was, at the time, approximately equal to the rate on overnight repurchase agreements.
44
"Treasury to Sell Short-Term Bills," New York Times, September 4, 1975 , p. 49. See similarly, "Treasury Will Offer 13-Day, 20-Day Bills Valued at $1.5 Billion," Wall Street Journal, September 4, 1975 "Congress Asked to Allow Up to 10-Year Terms," New York Times, September 30, 1975, p. 51. 46 Federal Reserve Bank of New York Circular no. 8452, "Implementation of New Treasury Tax and Loan Investment Program," November 9, 1978 . See also Lovett (1978) and Lang (1979) .
Termination of the Exemption
In early 1978, the most recent renewal of the $5 billion exemption to the prohibition of direct purchases was due to expire at the end of April. During an abbreviated hearing, three recent developments were noted:
 the introduction of short-term cash management bills that gave Treasury access to short-term credit and could be announced, auctioned, and issued in as little as two or three days, The first two items raised the possibility that the $5 billion exemption was no longer needed, that the introduction of short-term cash management bills and interest on TT&L deposits had 47
As provided by the Act of November 7, 1977. 48 Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs (April 5, 1978) .
49
Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs (April 5, 1978, pp. 1-3 
